La necesidad de la identidad al firmar. S. Tominaga, AKA CSW

The Necessity of Identity in Signing

La necesidad de la identidad al firmar

S. Tominaga, también conocido como CSW
8 de septiembre de 2024

Machine Translated by Google

Texto Original:
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1832727011225174479?t=HM1zLSOgglnwgLtsAY0cew&s=19

Para firmar cualquier documento, ya sea en forma física o digital, el concepto de identidad es indispensable. El acto mismo de firmar significa que una entidad identificable respalda la acción, ya sea como individuo u organización, y que esta entidad asume la responsabilidad del contenido al que se adjunta la firma. Sin identidad, una firma pierde su valor legal porque no puede atribuirse a ningún individuo o parte en particular. Este principio se aplica tanto si la firma es seudónima, anónima o vinculada a un nombre conocido y legalmente reconocido. Es importante explorar cómo se aplica esto tanto en contextos tradicionales como digitales, en particular bajo la ley del Reino Unido, que rige la validez de las firmas y la atribución de identidad.

La necesidad de la identidad para firmar

En el corazón de cualquier firma legal está la necesidad de un firmante identificable. En términos simples, una firma es una afirmación de que la persona que ha firmado acepta estar vinculada por los términos y condiciones establecidos en el documento relevante. Esto se refleja en la ley contractual inglesa, donde la identidad del firmante debe ser determinable para que el contrato sea válido. Por lo tanto, una firma no puede existir independientemente de una identidad. Incluso en los casos en que alguien firma bajo un seudónimo o un nombre ficticio, el seudónimo en sí mismo se considera una forma de identidad. Por ejemplo, en Chitty on Contracts, se reconoce que una firma no necesita ser el nombre real de la persona siempre que sirva para identificarla. Esto es fundamental, ya que los seudónimos se utilizan regularmente en diversos contextos legales y comerciales, pero estos seudónimos proporcionan un vínculo identificable con la persona detrás del acto.

En Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 AC 919, la Cámara de los Lores examinó la cuestión de la identidad en el contexto de un contrato de compra a plazos, donde la identidad fraudulenta dio lugar a una disputa sobre la responsabilidad contractual. En este caso, la importancia de identificar correctamente al firmante era clave, ya que el contrato dependía de la identidad real de la persona. El tribunal dictaminó que un contrato basado en una tergiversación fraudulenta de la identidad era nulo, lo que reforzó el principio de que la verdadera identidad del firmante es fundamental para la validez de un contrato.

Firmas seudónimas

Las firmas seudónimas complican aún más la cuestión de la identidad. En estos casos, el firmante firma con un nombre que no corresponde directamente a su nombre legal. Sin embargo, la legislación del Reino Unido reconoce desde hace tiempo que un seudónimo puede ser una forma válida de identidad, siempre que esté suficientemente vinculado a la persona. En contextos digitales, el seudónimo se vincula a una prueba criptográfica, que confirma la autenticidad de la identidad del firmante detrás del seudónimo. Un ejemplo clave se puede encontrar en la aplicación de la infraestructura de clave pública (PKI), un marco criptográfico utilizado para gestionar firmas digitales.

En el sistema PKI, una firma digital se basa en un par de claves criptográficas: una privada y una pública. La clave privada solo la conoce el firmante, mientras que la clave pública se puede distribuir ampliamente. Cuando un documento se firma digitalmente, la clave privada cifra la firma y cualquier persona con la clave pública correspondiente puede verificar que la firma coincide con el documento. Si bien este sistema permite el uso de seudónimos (en los que la clave pública puede estar asociada a una identidad seudónima), la identidad del firmante sigue siendo verificable a través de las claves criptográficas. Por lo tanto, incluso las firmas seudónimas conllevan identidad, aunque de una forma más abstracta.
En el caso de las firmas seudónimas, el seudónimo funciona como una identidad distinta dentro del entorno digital. Siempre que el seudónimo esté vinculado de forma constante a las mismas claves criptográficas, puede actuar como una forma válida de identidad según la legislación del Reino Unido, específicamente según la Ley de Comunicaciones Electrónicas de 2000 y el Reglamento eIDAS (Reglamento sobre Identificación Electrónica y Servicios de Confianza para Transacciones Electrónicas) de 2016. El reglamento eIDAS, en particular, establece los requisitos para las firmas electrónicas en toda la Unión Europea y sigue siendo aplicable en el Reino Unido después del Brexit. Según el eIDAS, las firmas electrónicas avanzadas (AES) deben estar vinculadas de forma única al firmante, con un proceso que pueda identificar a la persona o al seudónimo detrás de la firma. La firma también debe ser capaz de detectar cambios en los datos firmados, asegurando la integridad del documento.

Firmas anónimas

Por el contrario, las firmas anónimas no conllevan ningún vínculo identificable con el firmante, lo que las hace legalmente ineficaces. Tanto en el contexto digital como en el físico, una firma anónima no puede vincular legalmente a nadie con el contenido del documento porque no hay una entidad identificable detrás de la firma. La ley exige que la identidad, de alguna forma, esté presente para que el acto de firmar tenga algún peso legal. Sin este vínculo identificable, la firma pierde sentido desde un punto de vista legal.

En contextos digitales, el anonimato no puede ofrecer el mismo nivel de responsabilidad que el seudónimo. Mientras que una firma digital seudónima puede rastrearse hasta una entidad específica a través de medios criptográficos, una firma anónima carece de esta trazabilidad. En el Reino Unido, para que una firma digital sea válida según la Ley de Comunicaciones Electrónicas de 2000, debe ser atribuible a una persona u organización, incluso si la identidad se oculta mediante el uso de seudónimos. Sin esta atribución, una firma, ya sea física o digital, no cumple con los requisitos legales necesarios.

Ley de identidad y firma digital en el Reino Unido

La Ley de Comunicaciones Electrónicas de 2000 y el eIDAS forman la columna vertebral de la ley de firma digital en el Reino Unido. Estos marcos legales definen lo que constituye una firma electrónica válida y describen los requisitos para que las firmas digitales sean reconocidas como legalmente vinculantes. En particular, el eIDAS establece que una firma electrónica calificada debe basarse en un certificado calificado emitido por un proveedor de servicios de confianza. Este certificado verifica la identidad del firmante, ya sea directamente o de forma seudónima, lo que garantiza que la firma pueda rastrearse hasta una identidad verificable. Las corporaciones pueden firmar, al igual que los seudónimos

The Necessity of Identity in Signing 2

Los tribunales del Reino Unido han defendido sistemáticamente el principio de que la identidad es esencial para la validez de las firmas, incluidas las digitales. En Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd & Anor [2012] EWCA Civ 265, el Tribunal de Apelación consideró la validez de las comunicaciones electrónicas y si una firma de correo electrónico podía satisfacer las formalidades del Estatuto de Fraudes. El Tribunal dictaminó que un correo electrónico con un nombre escrito al final constituía una firma, destacando que incluso las firmas digitales deben estar vinculadas a una persona o entidad identificable para ser válidas. Si bien este caso no involucraba firmas seudónimas o anónimas, refuerza el principio más amplio de que la identidad sigue siendo un requisito fundamental para cualquier forma de firma.

De manera similar, en J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch), el tribunal determinó que la inclusión de una dirección de correo electrónico como firma podría ser válida en determinadas circunstancias, lo que establece aún más la conexión entre la identidad y la validez de las firmas digitales en la legislación del Reino Unido.

Implicaciones legales de la identidad en las transacciones digitales

La necesidad de identidad para firmar es especialmente relevante en las transacciones digitales, donde el uso de seudónimos y claves criptográficas es común. En entornos digitales, un seudónimo puede servir como una forma válida de identidad, siempre que pueda vincularse de manera consistente con el firmante. El seudónimo, cuando está respaldado por una prueba criptográfica, ofrece identidad suficiente para que una firma digital sea legalmente vinculante. Sin embargo, las firmas anónimas, que no se pueden atribuir a ninguna entidad, no cumplen los requisitos legales y, por lo tanto, son inválidas.
La legislación del Reino Unido exige que cualquier forma de firma electrónica, ya sea seudónima o de otro tipo, debe ser capaz de identificar al firmante. Esto está codificado en el eIDAS, que garantiza que la identidad del firmante es un componente fundamental de la validez de la firma. El uso de claves criptográficas proporciona los medios técnicos por los que se garantiza la identidad, lo que permite que los seudónimos funcionen como formas válidas de identidad dentro del marco legal. Sin embargo, sin ninguna forma de identidad, ya sea real o seudónima, la firma no puede tener fuerza legal.
Como tal, el concepto de identidad es parte integral del acto de firmar, tanto en el ámbito físico como en el digital. Ya sea que la identidad sea directa, seudónima o vinculada criptográficamente, es necesario que la firma sea legalmente válida.

El requisito de identidad está consagrado en la ley del Reino Unido, en particular a través de la Ley de Comunicaciones Electrónicas de 2000 y el eIDAS, que proporcionan la base legal para las firmas digitales y garantizan que todas las firmas puedan atribuirse a una persona o entidad identificable. Si bien los seudónimos pueden ofrecer una capa de anonimato, siguen funcionando como una forma de identidad en términos legales. Una firma anónima, por el contrario, no cumple con el umbral legal y es inválida. Por lo tanto, siempre se requiere la identidad, de alguna forma, para que el acto de firmar tenga algún significado legal.

Apéndice – Notas anteriores:

Cabe señalar que el juez Mellor no vio ninguna relación entre los conceptos de ninguno de estos trabajos en relación con Bitcoin de ninguna manera. Esto es a pesar de ser uno de los casos legales fundamentales sobre identidad, firmas y algunos de los conceptos fundamentales básicos de Bitcoin. Escribí estos artículos en 2005 cuando comencé a analizar conceptos de derecho de comercio electrónico, derecho de firma digital, derecho de identidad y derecho comercial y financiero en mi título de derecho financiero internacional.

Una revisión de Shogun v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62

Shogun v Hudson es un caso clásico tanto de fraude como de identidad equivocada. Los resultados de esta decisión tienen particular importancia para el crédito al consumidor y las transacciones de compra a plazos. Además, esta decisión respalda los principios fundamentales básicos del derecho contractual que se encuentran en

Primera parte: UNA REVISIÓN DE SHOGUN V HUDSON [2003] UKHL 62

Shogun v Hudson[1] es un caso clásico tanto de fraude como de identidad equivocada. Los resultados de esta decisión tienen particular importancia para las transacciones de crédito al consumo y compra a plazos. Además, esta decisión respalda los principios fundamentales básicos del derecho contractual fundados en la oferta y la aceptación. Sin embargo, debe notarse que la decisión de la mayoría en la Cámara de los Lores ha hecho poco para suprimir el debate en curso sobre la cuestión del error de identidad en el contrato.

La mayoría de los casos que tratan las cuestiones de identidad equivocada y fraude implican hechos similares. En cada uno, un «pícaro» tergiversa su identidad a la otra parte contratante. Esta tergiversación está diseñada, en general, para inducir a la víctima del pícaro a desprenderse de la propiedad u otro artículo de valor. El delincuente vende posteriormente la propiedad a un tercero inocente a cambio de una contraprestación. A menudo, la víctima acepta un cheque sin valor o la promesa de un pago futuro.

El propietario original de la propiedad generalmente no puede localizar al delincuente y, por lo tanto, intenta recuperar los bienes del tercero que ha recibido la propiedad. Esto deja a los tribunales en la posición de tener que decidir cuál de las dos partes inocentes se quedará con los bienes. La tarea poco envidiable es complicada porque una de las partes inocentes debe soportar una pérdida. Esta decisión ha dependido tradicionalmente de si el propietario inicial de la propiedad puede utilizar el error para anular el contrato o si el contrato es simplemente anulable.

Si el error es tal que el contrato es nulo ab initio, entonces no existe contrato entre el delincuente y el propietario original de la propiedad. En este caso, el delincuente no podrá transmitir un buen título de propiedad debido al principio de nemo dat quad non habit[2].

En el caso de que el tribunal determine que el contrato original es anulable y no nulo, el tercero puede ser capaz de perfeccionar el título de propiedad de los bienes. El resultado es una excepción al principio nemo dat[3]. Esta excepción se produce cuando un comprador de buena fe y sin previo aviso ha adquirido bienes que están sujetos a un contrato válido de compra a plazos; el título válido pasa al comprador de la propiedad.

Ha habido poca coherencia por parte de los tribunales a la hora de decidir cuál de las partes inocentes debe prevalecer. Al decidir quién es el verdadero propietario de la propiedad, el tribunal debe considerar la naturaleza precisa del error del vendedor y el proceso utilizado por el delincuente para apropiarse indebidamente de la propiedad. La jurisprudencia en torno a estas cuestiones se mantiene, sin duda, en un “estado lamentable”[4] e implica “distinciones ilógicas y a veces apenas perceptibles… que representan una política judicial no articulada sobre la incidencia de la pérdida entre dos partes inocentes”[5].

Shogun Finance Ltd v. Hudson (“Shogun Finance”)[6] proporcionó a la Cámara de los Lores la oportunidad de aclarar las áreas conflictivas de error en el derecho contractual. Sin embargo, la Cámara de los Lores ha decidido dejar la cuestión en manos del Parlamento para que la decida.

Resumen de los hechos del caso

Los hechos de este caso comenzaron cuando el estafador expresó su deseo de adquirir un vehículo motorizado Mitsubishi Shogun al concesionario de automóviles. El estafador se hizo pasar por el Sr. Durlabh Patel[7]. Para perpetrar el fraude, le dio al concesionario la dirección del Sr. Patel y un permiso de conducir robado que pertenecía a un tal Sr. Patel con la dirección mencionada anteriormente. El concesionario aceptó esto como prueba de la identidad del estafador, que se consideró erróneamente como la del Sr. Patel.

Las partes, el estafador y el concesionario acordaron un cargo por la compra del vehículo. Posteriormente, el concesionario envió por fax un borrador del contrato de compra a plazos y una copia del permiso de conducir utilizado falsamente a Shogun Finance Ltd. El estafador, utilizando una firma falsificada similar a la del permiso de conducir del Sr. Patel, había firmado el contrato de compra a plazos por escrito. Este contrato nombraba al Sr. Patel como parte contratante.

Shogun Finance Ltd realizó una verificación de crédito con la información proporcionada por el concesionario que se indicaba que provenía del Sr. Patel. Aceptaron el acuerdo basándose en la devolución de un buen informe crediticio. Shogun Finance, como propietario de la propiedad, aceptó alquilar el vehículo según los términos del acuerdo con el falso «Sr. Patel». Posteriormente, el concesionario le dio la posesión del vehículo al estafador. El estafador luego vendió el automóvil a un tal Sr. Norman Hudson, un comprador de buena fe y sin conocimiento, por £ 17,000 «en circunstancias que no surgen completamente de la sentencia» [8].

Cuando Shogun Finance Ltd finalmente descubrió el fraude, inició una acción contra el acusado, el Sr. Hudson, por daños resultantes del agravio de conversión. El acusado contrademandó que tenía un buen título sobre la propiedad a través de una excepción al principio nemo dat introducido por la sección 27 de la

Ley de compra a plazos de 1964. Esta excepción preveía que el demandado habría adquirido un buen título de propiedad en el caso de que se hubiera celebrado un contrato válido para el alquiler del vehículo y el posterior depósito en garantía por parte del delincuente.

En primera instancia, el tribunal determinó que Shogun Finance Ltd había expresado una clara intención de contratar con el Sr. Patel y con ninguna otra persona. Afirmaron que la identidad de la parte contratante era un término fundamental del contrato. Este punto, si se confirma en apelación, negaría al Sr. Hudson la disponibilidad de la excepción del artículo 27[9].
Como el Sr. Patel nunca había aceptado el contrato debido al uso fraudulento de su nombre, podía alegar válidamente una defensa de non est factum[10]. En consecuencia, el tribunal de primera instancia sostuvo que el acuerdo era nulo ab initio y que nunca había existido ningún contrato.

Tribunal de Apelación

Oponiéndose a la sentencia del Lord Justice Sedley, la mayoría del Tribunal de Apelación rechazó el argumento de los demandados de que el contrato se celebró inter praesentes entre el delincuente y el concesionario de automóviles. El demandado se basó en el argumento de que el comerciante estaba actuando en efecto como agente[11] de Shogun Finance Ltd. El juez Sedley afirmó que, si la ley lo permitía, había fuertes razones políticas por las que Shogun Finance Ltd debía soportar la pérdida. La posición de Shogun y, por lo tanto, su capacidad para descubrir un fraude y, posteriormente, evitar una pérdida eran mucho mayores que las del demandado. Por ejemplo, les habría resultado fácil enviar un documento por correo para verificar que el verdadero Sr. Patel había sido, de hecho, la parte que estaba tratando de contratar con ellos.

Al desestimar la apelación del Sr. Hudson, el juez Dyson (con el apoyo del juez Brooks) afirmó que el caso dependía de si el delincuente era un deudor en virtud de un contrato de compra a plazos en el sentido de la Ley de Compra a Plazos de 1964[12]. De ser así, podría transmitir el título válido a un tercero en virtud del artículo 27. Rechazó el argumento de Lord Justice Sedley de que cuando una parte celebra un contrato inter praesentes existe una creencia refutable de que la parte tiene la intención de negociar con la persona que se encuentra frente a ella, incluso si fraudulentamente se presenta como otra persona. También rechazó el argumento de que el comerciante estaba actuando como agente de Shogun, afirmando que: “es inútil y potencialmente engañoso decir que el comerciante en el presente caso era el agente de la compañía financiera”[13].

Lord Justice Sedley declaró que “desestimaría esta apelación con el argumento breve de que el delincuente no era el arrendatario nombrado en el contrato de compra a plazos escrito y, por lo tanto, no era el deudor en virtud de ese contrato. En este caso, el artículo 27(1) de la Ley de 1964 no puede ayudar al demandado”[14]. No abandonó su argumento en este punto, sino que pasó a “considerar si el acuerdo era nulo por error o simplemente anulable por tergiversación fraudulenta sin tener en cuenta el hecho de que el acuerdo estaba totalmente por escrito”[15] utilizando la decisión de Lord Justice Pearce en Ingram v. Little[16] como guía[17].

Cámara de los Lores

La Cámara de los Lores desestimó la apelación (3:2; Lord Nicholls y Lord Millett disintieron). Los Lores determinaron que, aunque se había celebrado un acuerdo escrito entre Shogun Finance Ltd y el verdadero Sr. Patel, este era nulo y, por lo tanto, nulo, ya que el Sr. Patel no proporcionó ninguna autoridad para ello. Por lo tanto, no existía ningún contrato entre el delincuente y el Shogun. El resultado de esto fue que el acusado no obtuvo protección de las exenciones del artículo 27 al principio nemo dat.

Mucha controversia rodea este caso[18]. Gran parte de esta controversia surge directamente del razonamiento dado en los discursos de los Lords Millett y Nicholas. Sus motivos para disentir con la mayoría se basan en reglas fundamentales de derecho separadas. Lord Hobhouse (en la mayoría) creía que la cuestión se limitaba únicamente a la interpretación del acuerdo escrito entre Shogun y el delincuente que pretendía ser el Sr. Patel. Un intento de presentar pruebas fracasó porque la regla de la prueba oral[19] impide la admisión de pruebas que contradigan el contrato escrito. Dado que el acuerdo era una oferta del Sr. Patel seguida de la aceptación de Shogun, solo Shogun y el Sr. Patel podían ser partes del acuerdo[20]. Una consecuencia directa de su razonamiento fue que la prueba oral no era admisible para contradecir los términos del acuerdo escrito. Por lo tanto, el demandado no pudo demostrar que el delincuente era parte del contrato a través de transacciones inter praesentes con el concesionario de automóviles. Por lo tanto, no podía haber un contrato con el delincuente y la defensa del demandado debería fracasar.

Señaló que las transacciones de crédito al consumo, como el arrendamiento y la compra a plazos, se basaban fundamentalmente en la identidad del cliente y su calificación crediticia. La redacción del acuerdo de Shogun era tal que el cliente hacía una oferta, que Shogun podía aceptar o rechazar. Por lo tanto, Shogun tendría que aceptar la propuesta final en lugar de que el cliente hiciera la aceptación.

Lord Hobhouse afirmó que los argumentos del demandado eran “erróneos”[21] en el sentido de que no abordaron la regla nemo dat, sino que se centraron en resolver problemas con la Ley de Venta de Bienes[22].

Otro problema fue la falta de consideración del hecho de que la transacción era un acuerdo de crédito al consumidor para el depósito de bienes. Además, el acusado no tuvo en cuenta la regla de prueba verbal al desarrollar su caso. Lord Hobhouse creía que esto tenía que fallar ya que podría privar a los contratos escritos de certeza[23].

Los Lords Phillips y Walker (en la mayoría) opinaron que la oferta y la aceptación se determinaban objetivamente de acuerdo con las conclusiones de Lord Hobhouse. Lord Phillips opinaba que la ley era clara y que la dificultad radicaba en la evaluación de los hechos[24].

Los Lords afirmaron la presunción de que en los tratos inter praesentes, la intención es tratar con la persona físicamente presente. Sin embargo, esto lleva a la pregunta de qué constituye un contrato celebrado inter praesentes. Lord Walker consideró además que esto podría incluir tratos por teléfono u otra tecnología similar[25]. De este razonamiento se puede deducir que el caso Ingram v Little[26] está incorrectamente decidido.

Sin embargo, los Lords señalaron que esta presunción no podía aplicarse a los contratos negociados por escrito. Esto incluiría los contratos celebrados por correo postal, correo electrónico o fax. La regla de la prueba verbal significaría que la cuestión de la oferta y la aceptación se discutiría exclusivamente sobre la base de los documentos escritos. La cuestión relativa a la situación cuando el oferente no existe quedó sin abordar[27]. Tanto los Lords Phillips como Walker rechazaron la opinión de Lord Sedley. Ninguno creía que el concesionario de automóviles actuara como agente de Shogun Finance Ltd, y su opinión se derivaba de la mención expresa de las partes en el documento escrito[28].

La mayoría ha expresado una política clara diseñada en sus discursos. Está claro que la mayoría consideró que las empresas de crédito al consumo necesitaban protección contra el fraude más que los consumidores. La primacía del acuerdo escrito y el apoyo a la distinción existente en la ley entre contratos postales[29] (o aquellos celebrados inter absentes) versus tratos cara a cara[30] (celebrados inter praesentes) han sido apoyados por la decisión de la Cámara de los Lores.

La minoría pide reformas

Los lores Nicholas y Millett disintieron centrándose en la naturaleza arbitraria de la ley. Parecería que estaban tratando de limpiar la “lamentable condición”[31], en la que se había visto forzada la ley. La decisión de los Lores refuerza las anomalías existentes en la ley.

Tanto los lores Nicholas como Millett buscaron reemplazar la decisión de Cundy v Lindsay con un principio más general. El principio sugerido de que “se presume que una persona tiene la intención de contratar con la persona con la que realmente está tratando”[32] crea sus propios problemas. Por ejemplo, la definición arbitraria de “trato” puede tener numerosos contextos. Esta opinión refleja el enfoque establecido por Lord Denning[33] de que todos los errores en cuanto a la identidad deberían hacer que el contrato fuera anulable en todos los casos, haciendo que la pérdida se imputara al vendedor en lugar de a la tercera parte “inocente”.

Las sentencias mayoritarias llaman la atención sobre la complejidad que impone la confianza en el nombre proporcionado en un documento escrito. Como resultado, el enfoque utilizado por la mayoría de los Lords puede no ser tan claro como han afirmado.

Lord Nicholls[34] afirmó que, dada la opción de elegir entre dos partes inocentes, “la pérdida la soporta más apropiadamente la persona que asume los riesgos inherentes a desprenderse de sus bienes sin recibir el pago”[35]. Lord Millett también sugirió que “seguramente es más justo que la parte que fue realmente estafada y que tuvo la oportunidad de descubrir el fraude soporte la pérdida en lugar de una parte que entró en escena solo después de que se hubiera llevado a cabo la estafa”[36].

Lord Millett demuestra la dificultad que se impone en este tipo de casos al señalar que “[g]eneraciones de estudiantes de derecho han luchado con este problema” y que “se les puede perdonar que piensen que es una invención de sus tutores para poner a prueba su temple”[37]. Sin embargo, la cuestión se deriva de las ideologías conflictivas que han creado el common law de contratos[38].

Lord Phillips dijo que se sentía fuertemente atraído por esa solución[39], pero también le parecía imposible conciliarla con los principios básicos del derecho. Esa solución se centraba en deducir la intención de las palabras y la conducta, lo que simplemente no era adecuado cuando las negociaciones se hacían completamente por escrito.

Lords Nicholls y Millett aparentemente deseaban reformar la ley[40]. Con este fin, propusieron que cuando dos individuos “negocian” entre sí, por cualquier medio, y cumplen los requisitos para formar un contrato, se produce un contrato. Creen que esto es independiente de cualquier engaño de una parte a la otra en cuanto a la identidad. Por lo tanto, creen que todos los contratos en este caso deberían ser anulables a instancia de la parte engañada, no nulos desde el principio. (not void ab initio).

Definición de error

Shogun v Hudson demuestra que la ley inglesa reconocen la doctrina del error contractual. Sin embargo, el alcance del error contractual es extremadamente limitado. La doctrina inglesa del error puede hacer que un contrato sea nulo cuando ambas partes hayan celebrado el acuerdo sobre la base de un error compartido. Uno de los requisitos para que esta doctrina sea válida es que ninguna de las partes sea culpable[41].

La Cámara de los Lores en Shogun no aclaró la posición del error contractual en situaciones que van más allá del error común[42]. Tales situaciones incluyen negociaciones que involucran a una sola parte que cometió el error. Si bien existen numerosos casos en los que el tribunal ha otorgado reparación[43] a una de las partes en tales circunstancias, no está claro si la reparación fue el resultado de la aplicación por parte del tribunal de una doctrina unificada del error o si (como parecería más probable) es el resultado de la aplicación de otros principios contractuales.

La mayoría en Shogun ha argumentado de manera convincente que los problemas que involucran un error unilateral tienen una resolución en la aplicación de los principios fundadores del derecho contractual inglés. Por lo tanto, la oferta, la aceptación y la regla de la prueba verbal siguen siendo de importancia fundamental en la contratación. El profesor Treitel denomina esto como «teoría de la oferta y la aceptación»[44].

Lord Walker en Shogun resumió esto de la siguiente manera:
“El otro punto general es que (de acuerdo, creo, con todos sus señorías) considero que la cuestión en esta apelación es esencialmente un problema sobre oferta y aceptación; y al determinar si un contrato se ha formado o no mediante oferta y aceptación, el tribunal adopta un enfoque objetivo y no investiga lo que cada parte realmente pretendía, sino el efecto, evaluado objetivamente, de lo que dijeron o escribieron”. [45]

Error en cuanto a la identidad

Antes de Shogun Finance, la jurisprudencia dividía las cuestiones de error en dos perspectivas distintas. Las negociaciones realizadas inter praesentes proporcionaban un resultado separado de aquellas negociaciones, que concluían inter absentes. La fuente de esta división en la ley provino de la decisión de la Cámara de los Lores en Cundy v Lindsay[46]. Este caso dependía de un delincuente, Blenkarn, que realizó un pedido por escrito de una serie de pañuelos de tal manera que el pedido escrito parecía provenir de Blenkiron & Co. (una firma respetada). Blenkarn vendió los bienes a un comprador de buena fe sin conocimiento: Cundy. Lindsay, el propietario original de los bienes, no logró localizar a Blenkarn para recuperar los bienes. Como resultado, Lindsay inició una acción contra Cundy por una reclamación de conversión.

Este caso giraba en torno a la cuestión de si el demandante y propietario original de la propiedad había conservado el título requerido para la propiedad. Si Lindsay no había conservado el título de propiedad, entonces la acción era insostenible.

La Cámara de los Lores sostuvo que el demandante había conservado el título porque no se había celebrado un contrato válido con el delincuente. Lord Cairns concluyó que, como la parte del contrato era Blenkiron y no Blenkarn debido a los principios del derecho contractual inglés, que impiden la presentación de pruebas en contradicción con un contrato escrito. Otra ratificación de esta decisión se produjo en Philips v Brooks Ltd[47]. En este caso, el delincuente obtuvo joyas utilizando un cheque fraudulento en el que pretendía ser Sir George Bullough.

En los tratos cara a cara, sus Señorías observaron que existía una presunción refutable de que los contratos celebrados entre las partes que trataban entre sí eran anulables. En tales casos, el contrato era anulable, no nulo. Las distinciones entre las negociaciones contractuales celebradas cara a cara y las celebradas por correspondencia han dado lugar a mucha confusión. Además, las distintas sentencias sobre estos diversos casos, que han puesto de relieve las disparidades entre los tratos celebrados inter praesentes y los celebrados inter absentes, han creado los debates actuales. La decisión de la Cámara de los Lores de no aprovechar esta oportunidad para reformar la ley garantizará que el debate continúe.

Conclusión

Este caso se refería a la interpretación de un contrato escrito. Un resultado de esta decisión es la demostración de que los fundamentos fundamentales del derecho contractual escrito en el Reino Unido siguen siendo sólidos. Estos son la oferta, la aceptación, el acuerdo mutuo, la regla de la prueba verbal y la regla nemo dat. Los casos relativos al uso de contratos para la venta de bienes, celebrados inter praesentes, siguen sin ser de ninguna ayuda para decidir cuestiones derivadas de tratos celebrados inter absentes.

Se esperaba ampliamente que la Cámara de los Lores aprovechara esta oportunidad brindada por el caso para dilucidar un área compleja del derecho al decidir a favor del acusado y construir principios rectores inequívocos para llevar adelante casos similares en el futuro. Sin embargo, la decisión de los Lores refleja las diferentes actitudes y creencias de los tribunales que habían actuado antes. La atracción de Lord Phillip por las opiniones de la minoría al desestimar la apelación resalta las divisiones.

Las corporaciones de crédito (y, sin duda, otras que brindan servicios de crédito al consumidor documentados) recibirán, por supuesto, la decisión con los brazos abiertos. Como consecuencia, y en vista de la creciente frecuencia de fraudes de identidad y de compradores (probablemente exacerbados por las nuevas tecnologías como Internet y el comercio electrónico), esta sentencia ofrece una considerable tranquilidad a quienes celebran contratos inter absentes o utilizan un proceso escrito para celebrar contratos.

En cambio, el tercero inocente[48], el comprador, sigue sin protección. Sigue habiendo un margen significativo para que surjan diferencias de opinión en situaciones en las que los contratos se celebran inter absentes frente a los celebrados inter praesentes. Esto también pone de relieve la prudencia de garantizar que los contratos siempre se celebren por escrito.

La solución propuesta por los lores Nichols y Millett en estas situaciones probablemente resulte más atractiva para la población en general y se imponga mediante códigos en otras jurisdicciones[49]. Sin embargo, la Cámara de los Lores ha dejado en manos del Parlamento la decisión de reformar la ley.

The Necessity of Identity in Signing

S. Tominaga AKA CSW
Sep 8, 2024
https://x.com/CsTominaga/status/1832727011225174479?t=HM1zLSOgglnwgLtsAY0cew&s=19

https://t.me/S_Tominaga/301

In order to sign any document, whether in a physical or digital form, the concept of identity is indispensable. The very act of signing signifies that an identifiable entity stands behind the action, either as an individual or organisation, and that this entity takes responsibility for the content to which the signature is appended. Without identity, a signature loses its legal standing because it cannot be attributed to any particular individual or party. This principle holds whether the signature is pseudonymous, anonymous, or linked to a known, legally recognised name. It is important to explore how this applies in both traditional and digital contexts, particularly under UK law, which governs the validity of signatures and the attribution of identity.

The Necessity of Identity in Signing

At the heart of any legal signature is the need for an identifiable signatory. In the simplest terms, a signature is an assertion that the individual who has signed agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions set out in the relevant document. This is reflected in English contract law, where the signatory’s identity must be ascertainable for the contract to be valid. A signature, therefore, cannot exist independently of an identity. Even in cases where someone signs under a pseudonym or assumed name, the pseudonym itself is treated as a form of identity. For example, in Chitty on Contracts, it is acknowledged that a signature does not need to be the person’s actual name so long as it serves to identify the person. This is critical, as pseudonyms are regularly used in various legal and commercial contexts, yet these pseudonyms provide an identifiable link to the individual behind the act.

In Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 AC 919, the House of Lords examined the issue of identity in the context of a hire-purchase agreement, where fraudulent identity led to a dispute over contractual liability. In this case, the importance of correctly identifying the signatory was key, as the contract hinged on the real identity of the person. The court ruled that a contract based on fraudulent misrepresentation of identity was void, reinforcing the principle that the true identity of the signatory is central to the validity of a contract.

Pseudonymous Signatures

Pseudonymous signatures further complicate the issue of identity. In such instances, the signatory is signing under a name that does not directly correspond to their legal name. However, UK law has long recognised that a pseudonym can be a valid form of identity, provided that the pseudonym is sufficiently connected to the person. In digital contexts, the pseudonym becomes tied to cryptographic proof, which confirms the authenticity of the signatory’s identity behind the pseudonym. A key example can be found in the application of public key infrastructure (PKI), a cryptographic framework used to manage digital signatures.

Under the PKI system, a digital signature relies on a pair of cryptographic keys: one private and one public. The private key is known only to the signatory, while the public key can be distributed widely. When a document is signed digitally, the private key encrypts the signature, and anyone with the corresponding public key can verify that the signature matches the document. While this system allows for the use of pseudonyms—where the public key may be associated with a pseudonymous identity—the identity of the signatory remains verifiable through the cryptographic keys. Thus, even pseudonymous signatures carry identity, albeit in a more abstracted form.

In the case of pseudonymous signatures, the pseudonym functions as a distinct identity within the digital environment. As long as the pseudonym is consistently linked to the same cryptographic keys, it can act as a valid form of identity under UK law, specifically under the Electronic Communications Act 2000 and eIDAS (Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations) 2016. The eIDAS regulation, in particular, sets out the requirements for electronic signatures across the European Union and remains applicable in the UK post-Brexit. Under eIDAS, advanced electronic signatures (AES) must be uniquely linked to the signatory, with a process that can identify the individual or pseudonym behind the signature. The signature must also be capable of detecting changes to the signed data, ensuring the integrity of the document.

Anonymous Signatures

By contrast, anonymous signatures do not carry any identifiable link to the signer, making them legally ineffective. In both the digital and physical contexts, an anonymous signature cannot legally bind anyone to the content of the document because there is no identifiable entity behind the signature. The law requires that identity, in some form, be present for the act of signing to carry any legal weight. Without this identifiable link, the signature becomes meaningless from a legal standpoint.

In digital contexts, anonymity cannot offer the same level of accountability as pseudonymity. While a pseudonymous digital signature can be traced back to a specific entity through cryptographic means, an anonymous signature lacks this traceability. In the UK, for a digital signature to be valid under the Electronic Communications Act 2000, it must be attributable to a person or organisation, even if the identity is obfuscated through the use of pseudonyms. Without this attribution, a signature, whether physical or digital, fails to meet the necessary legal requirements.

Identity and Digital Signature Law in the UK

The Electronic Communications Act 2000 and eIDAS form the backbone of digital signature law in the UK. These legal frameworks define what constitutes a valid electronic signature and outline the requirements for digital signatures to be recognised as legally binding. In particular, eIDAS provides that a qualified electronic signature must be based on a qualified certificate issued by a trusted service provider. This certificate verifies the identity of the signatory, either directly or pseudonymously, ensuring that the signature can be traced back to a verifiable identity.

Imagen

Corporations can sign as can pseuodnyms

The UK courts have consistently upheld the principle that identity is essential in the validity of signatures, including digital signatures. In Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd & Anor [2012] EWCA Civ 265, the Court of Appeal considered the validity of electronic communications and whether an email signature could satisfy the formalities of the Statute of Frauds. The Court ruled that an email with a name typed at the end constituted a signature, highlighting that even digital signatures must be linked to an identifiable person or entity to be valid. While this case did not involve pseudonymous or anonymous signatures, it reinforces the broader principle that identity remains a core requirement for any form of signature.

Similarly, in J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch), the court found that the inclusion of an email address as a signature could be valid under certain circumstances, further establishing the connection between identity and the validity of digital signatures in UK law.

Legal Implications of Identity in Digital Transactions

The necessity of identity in signing is especially relevant in digital transactions, where the use of pseudonyms and cryptographic keys is common. In digital environments, a pseudonym can serve as a valid form of identity, as long as it can be consistently tied to the signatory. The pseudonym, when backed by cryptographic proof, offers sufficient identity to make a digital signature legally binding. However, anonymous signatures, which cannot be attributed to any entity, do not meet the legal requirements and are therefore invalid.

UK law requires that any form of electronic signature, whether pseudonymous or otherwise, must be capable of identifying the signatory. This is codified in eIDAS, which ensures that the identity of the signatory is a fundamental component of the signature’s validity. The use of cryptographic keys provides the technical means by which identity is assured, allowing pseudonyms to function as valid forms of identity within the legal framework. However, without any form of identity, whether real or pseudonymous, the signature cannot carry legal force.

As such, the concept of identity is integral to the act of signing, both in the physical and digital realms. Whether the identity is direct, pseudonymous, or cryptographically linked, it is necessary for the signature to be legally valid. The requirement of identity is enshrined in UK law, particularly through the Electronic Communications Act 2000 and eIDAS, which provide the legal basis for digital signatures and ensure that all signatures can be attributed to an identifiable person or entity. While pseudonyms can offer a layer of anonymity, they still function as a form of identity in legal terms. An anonymous signature, by contrast, fails to meet the legal threshold and is invalid. Thus, identity, in some form, is always required for the act of signing to have any legal significance.

Appendix – Past Notes:

It should be noted that Justice Mellor saw no relationship between the concepts in any of these works as related to bitcoin in any way. That is despite being one of the foundational legal cases concerning identity, signatures and some of the core foundational concepts of bitcoin. I wrote these papers in 2005 when I started analysing until concepts of electronic commerce law, digital signature law, identity law and trade and finance law in my international finance law degree.

A Review of Shogun v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62

Shogun v Hudsonis a classic case of both fraud and mistaken identity. The outcomes of this decision hold particular importance to consumer credit and hire purchase transactions. Further, this decision supports the basic fundamental principles of contract law founded on offer and acceptance. It must however be noted that the decision of the majority in the House of Lords has done little to suppress the ongoing debate as to the issue of identity mistake in contract.

Part One – A REVIEW OF SHOGUN V HUDSON [2003] UKHL 62

Shogun v Hudson[1] is a classic case of both fraud and mistaken identity. The outcomes of this decision hold particular importance to consumer credit and hire purchase transactions. Further, this decision supports the basic fundamental principles of contract law founded on offer and acceptance. It must however be noted that the decision of the majority in the House of Lords has done little to suppress the ongoing debate as to the issue of identity mistake in contract.

The majority of cases dealing with the issues of mistaken identity and fraud entail similar facts. In each, a «rogue» misrepresents his/her identity to the other contracting party. This misrepresentation is in general, designed to induce the rogue’s victim to part with property or another item of value. The rogue subsequently sells the property to an innocent third party for consideration. Often the victim accepts a worthless cheque or promise of future payment.

The original owner of the property is generally unable to trace the rogue and thus seeks to recover the goods from the third party who has received the property. This leaves the courts in the position of having to decide as to which of the two innocent parties will retain the goods. The unenviable task is complicated because one of the innocent parties must bear a loss. This decision has traditionally depended on whether the initial owner of the property can use the mistake to void the contract or if the contract is merely voidable.

If the mistake is such that the contract is void ab initio, then no contract exists between the rogue and the original owner of the property. In this case, the rogue will be unable to pass good title to the property due to the principle of nemo dat quad non habit[2].

In the case that the court holds the original contract to be voidable and not void, the third party may be able to perfect title to the goods. The result comes from an exception to the nemo datprinciple[3]. This exception develops when a buyer in good faith without notice has purchased goods that are subject to a valid hire purchase agreement; good title passes to the purchaser of the property.

There has been little consistency from the courts in deciding which of the innocent parties should prevail. In deciding the true owner of the property, the court needs to consider the precise nature of the seller’s mistake and the process used by the rogue to misappropriate the property. Case law surrounding these issues arguably remains in a “sorry condition”[4] and involves “illogical and sometimes barely perceptible distinctions… representing an unarticulated judicial policy on the incidence of loss between two innocent parties”[5].

Shogun Finance Ltd v. Hudson (“Shogun Finance”)[6] provided the opportunity for the House of Lords to clean up the conflicting areas of mistake in contract law. The House of Lords has however decided to leave the issue for Parliament to decide.

A summary of the facts from the case

The facts of this case began when the rogue articulated a wish to procure a Mitsubishi Shogun motor vehicle to the car dealer. The rogue misrepresented himself to be Mr Durlabh Patel[7]. In order to perpetrate the fraud he gave the dealer Mr Patel’s address and a stolen driving licence belonging to one Mr Patel of the afore mentioned address. The dealer accepted this as substantiation of the rouge’s identity, which was mistakenly deemed that of Mr Patel.

The parties, the rogue and the dealer agreed to a charge for the purchase of the vehicle. Subsequent to this, the dealer faxed a draft hire purchase agreement and a copy of the falsely used driving licence to Shogun Finance Ltd. The rogue, using a forged signature similar to that on Mr Patel’s driving licence, had signed the written hire purchase agreement. This agreement named Mr Patel as the contracting party.

Shogun Finance Ltd ran a credit check against the information provided by the dealer stated as originating from Mr Patel. They accepted the agreement based on the return of a good credit report. Shogun finance as the owner of the property agreed to hire the vehicle under the terms of the agreement with the false “Mr Patel”. Subsequent to this, the dealer gave possession of the vehicle to the rogue. The rogue then sold the car to one Mr Norman Hudson, a purchaser in good faith and without knowledge for £17,000 “in circumstances which do not emerge fully from the judgement”[8].

When Shogun Finance Ltd eventually discovered the fraud, they initiated an action against the defendant, Mr Hudson for damages resulting from the tort of conversion. The defendant counterclaimed that he had good title over the property through an exception to the nemo dat principle introduced by section 27 of the Hire Purchase Act 1964. This exception provided that the defendant would have acquired good title in the property where a valid contract for the hire of the vehicle and subsequent bailment by the rouge had concluded.

At first instance, the court found that Shogun Finance Ltd had expressed a clear intention to contract with Mr Patel and no other person. They claimed that the identity of the contracting party was a fundamental term of contract. This point, if upheld in appeal, would deny Mr Hudson the availability of the s27[9] exception.

As Mr Patel had never agreed to the contract due to the fraudulent use of his name, he could validly claim a defence of non est factum[10]. Accordingly, the court at first instance held that the agreement was void ab initio and no contract had ever existed.

Court of Appeal

Opposing Lord Justice Sedley’s judgment, the majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the defendants argument that the contract was concluded inter praesentes between the rogue and the car dealer. The defendant relied on an argument that the dealer was in effect acting as an agent[11] for Shogun Finance Ltd. Lord Justice Sedley stated that, the law permitting, there were strong policy reasons why Shogun Finance Ltd should bear the loss. Shogun’s position and thus ability to discover a fraud and subsequently avoid a loss was far greater than that of the defendant. It would for instance have been easy for them to send a document through the post in order to verify that the real Mr Patel had indeed been the party that was trying to contract with them.

Dismissing the appeal from Mr Hudson, Lord Justice Dyson (Lord Justice Brooks in agreement) stated that the case hinged on whether the rogue was a debtor under a hire purchase agreement within the meaning of the Hire Purchase Act 1964[12]. If so, he could pass good title to a third party under s27. He rejected Lord Justice Sedley’s argument that where a party Contracts inter praesentes there is a refutable belief that the party intends to deal with the person standing in front of them, even if they fraudulently misrepresent themselves as another person. He also rejected the argument that the dealer was acting as an agent for Shogun stating that: “it is unhelpful and potentially misleading to say that the dealer in the present case was the agent of the finance company”[13].

Lord Justice Sedley stated that he “would dismiss this appeal on the short ground that the rogue was not the hirer named in the written hire purchase agreement, and was therefore not the debtor under that agreement. In the event, section 27(1) of the 1964 Act cannot avail the defendant”[14]. He did not leave his argument at this point, but rather went on to “consider whether the agreement was void for mistake or merely voidable for fraudulent misrepresentation without regard to the fact that the agreement was wholly in writing”[15] using the decision of Lord Justice Pearce in Ingram v. Little[16] as guidance[17].

House of Lords

The House of Lords dismissed the appeal (3:2; Lord Nicholls and Lord Millett dissenting). The Lords determined that although a written agreement concluded between Shogun Finance Ltd and the real Mr Patel, this was void and thus a nullity as Mr Patel did not provide any authority for it. Thus, no contract between the rogue and the Shogun existed. The result of this being that the defendant gained no protection from the s27 exemptions to the nemo dat principle.

Much controversy surrounds this case[18]. Much of this controversy stems directly from the reasoning given in the speeches of Lords Millett and Nicholas. Their grounds for dissenting with the majority being based on separate fundamental rules of law.

Lord Hobhouse (in the majority) believed that the issue was limited solely to the construction of the written agreement between Shogun and the rogue purporting to be Mr Patel. An attempt to adduce evidence failed as the parole evidence[19]rule precludes the admission of evidence that contradicts the written contract. Being that the agreement was an offer by Mr Patel followed by acceptance from Shogun, only Shogun and Mr Patel could be parties to the agreement[20]. A direct consequence of his reasoning was that oral evidence was not admissible to contradict the terms of the written agreement. Therefore, the defendant was not able to demonstrate that the rogue was a party to the contract through inter praesentes transactions with the car dealer. Thus, there could be no contract with the rogue and the defendants defence should fail.

He noted that consumer credit transactions such as leasing and hire purchase fundamentally based on the identity of the customer and their credit rating. The wording of Shogun’s agreement was such that the client made an offer, which Shogun could accept or reject. Thus, Shogun would need to accept the final proposal rather than the client making the acceptance.

Lord Hobhouse stated that the defendant’s arguments were “mistaken”[21] in that they did not address the nemo dat rule but rather focused on sorting out issues with the Sale of Goods Act[22]. Another issue was the lack of regard as to the fact that the transaction was a consumer credit arrangement for the bailment of property. Further, the defendant failed to consider the parole evidence rule when developing his case. Lord Hobhouse believed that this had to fail as it could deprive written contracts of certainty[23].

Lords Phillips and Walker (in the majority) formed the view that offer and acceptance were objectively determined in accordance with the findings of Lord Hobhouse. Lord Phillips was of the opinion that the law was clear and the difficulty lay in the assessment of facts[24].

The Lords affirmed the presumption that in inter praesentes dealings; the intention is to deal with the person physically present. This however leads the question as to what constitute a contract formed inter praesentes. Lord Walker further considered that this might include dealings over a telephone or other similar technology[25]. It may follow from this reasoning, that Ingram v Little[26] is incorrectly decided.

However, the Lords noted that this presumption could not apply to contracts negotiated in writing. This would include contracts that concluded through the post, e-mail, or faxes. The parole evidence rule would mean that the issue of offer and acceptance be argued exclusively on the written documents. The issue concerning the position when the offeror does not exist remained unaddressed[27]. Both Lords Phillips and Walker rejected Lord Sedley’s opinion. Neither believed that the car dealer acted as an agent for Shogun Finance Ltd, their opinion deriving from the express naming of the parties in the written document[28].

The majority has expressed a clear policy designed in their speeches. It is clear that the majority considered that consumer credit companies needed protection from fraud more than consumers did. The primacy of the written agreement and support for the existing distinction in law between postal contracts[29](or those concluded inter absentes) versus face to face dealings[30] (concluded inter praesentes) has been supported by the decision in the House of Lords.

The minority call for reform

Lords Nicholas and Millett dissented by focusing on the arbitrary nature of the law. It would seem that they were attempting to clean up the “sorry condition”[31], into which the law had been forced. The decision of the Lords reinforces the existing anomalies in the law.

Both Lords Nicholas and Millett sought to replace the decision of Cundy v Lindsaywith a more general principle. The suggested principle that “[a] person is presumed to intend to contract with the person with whom he is actually dealing”[32]creates its own issues. For instance, the arbitrary definition of “dealing” may have numerous contexts. This view reflects Lord Denning’s[33]stated approach that all mistakes as to identity should render the contract voidable in all cases rendering the loss be apportioned to the vendor rather than the “innocent” third party.

The majority judgments draw attention to the complexity imposed by reliance on the name provided in a written document. As a result, the approach used by the majority of the Lords may not be as clear as they have asserted.

Lord Nicholls[34]stated that given an option to choose between two innocent parties, “the loss is more appropriately borne by the person who takes the risks inherent in parting with his goods without receiving payment”[35]. Lord Millett likewise suggested, “it is surely fairer that the party who was actually swindled and who had an opportunity to uncover the fraud should bear the loss rather than a party who entered the picture only after the swindle had been carried out”[36].

Lord Millett demonstrates the difficulty imposed in this type of case by noting, “[g]enerations of law students have struggled with this problem” and how “[t]hey may be forgiven for thinking that it is contrived by their tutors to test their mettle”[37].

The issue however derives from the conflicting ideologies that have created the common law of contract[38].

Lord Phillips said that he was strongly attracted to such a solution[39], but he also found it impossible to reconcile it with the basic principles of law. Such a solution focused on deducing intention from words and conduct which was simply not suitable where negotiations are entirely in writing.

Lords Nicholls and Millett apparently desired to reform the law[40]. To this end, they proposed that where two individuals “deal” with each other, by whatever means, and complete the requirements to form a contract, a contract results. They believe that this is independent as to any deception from one party to the other as to identity. Thus, they believe that all contracts in this instance should be voidable at the instance of the deceived party, not void ab initio.

Defining Mistake

Shogun v Hudson demonstrates that English law does recognise the doctrine of contractual mistake. However, the scope of contractual mistake is extremely narrow. The English doctrine of mistake may render a contract void where both parties are the agreement had contracted based on a shared mistake. One of the requirements for this doctrine hold true is that neither party is at fault[41].

The House of Lords in Shogun did not clarify the position of contractual mistake in situations that extend beyond common mistake[42]. Such situations include negotiations involving a single mistaken party. Whilst there exist numerous cases where the court has granted relief[43] to one party in such circumstances, it remains unclear as to whether relief was as a result of the court applying a unified doctrine of mistake or whether (as would seem more likely) it is a result of the application of other contractual principles.

The majority in Shogun have convincingly argued that problems involving unilateral mistake have a resolution in the application of the founding principles of English contract law. Thus, offer, acceptance and the parole evidence rule remain of fundamental importance in contracting. Professor Treitel terms this as “offer and acceptance theory”[44].

Lord Walker in Shogun summed this up as follows:

“The other general point is that (in agreement, I think, with all your Lordships) I regard the issue in this appeal as essentially a problem about offer and acceptance; and in determining whether or not a contract has been formed by offer and acceptance, the court adopts an objective approach, and does not inquire into what either party actually intended, but the effect, objectively assessed of what they said or wrote.”[45]

Mistake as to Identity

Before Shogun Finance, case law divided issues of mistake into two distinct perspectives. Negotiations conducted inter praesentes provided a separate result to those negotiations, which concluded, inter absentes. The source of this division in the law came from the House of Lords’ decision in Cundy v Lindsay[46]. This case hinged on a rogue, Blenkarn who placed an order in writing for a number of handkerchiefs in such a way that is a written order appeared to come from Blenkiron & Co. (a respected firm). Blenkarn sold the goods to a bona fide purchaser without knowledge: Cundy. Lindsay, the original owner of the goods, failed to trace Blenkarn to recover the goods. As a result, Lindsay initiated an action against Cundy for a claim of conversion.

This case revolved upon the issue as to whether the claimant and original owner of the property had retained the requisite title to the property. If Lindsay had not retained title to the property, then the action was unsustainable.

The House of Lords held that the claimant had retained title as no valid contract concluded with the rogue. Lord Cairns concluded that, as the party to the contract was Blenkiron and not Blenkarn due to the principles in English contract law, which preclude producing evidence in contradiction to a written contract. Further ratification of this decision occurred in Philips v Brooks Ltd[47]. In this case, the rogue procured jewellery using a fraudulent cheque where he purported to be Sir George Bullough.

In face-to-face dealings, their Lordships noted that there was a rebuttable presumption that contracts concluded between the parties that dealt with each other. In such cases, the contract was voidable not void. The distinctions between contractual negotiations conducted face-to-face versus those concluded through correspondence has led to much confusion. Further, the distinct rulings on these various cases, which have highlighted the disparities between dealings concluded inter praesentes against inter absentes have created the current debates. The decision of the House of Lords not to use this opportunity to reform the law will ensure that the debate continues.

Conclusion

This case concerned the construction of a written contract. A result of this decision is the demonstration that the fundamental foundations of written contract law in the United Kingdomremain strong. These are, offer, acceptance, mutual agreement, the parole evidence rule and the nemo dat rule. The cases concerning the use of contracts for the sale of goods, made inter praesentes, remain to be of no assistance in deciding issues resulting from dealings concluded inter absentes.

It was widely hoped that the House of Lords would use this opportunity provided by the case to elucidate a complex area of law by deciding for the defendant and constructing unambiguous guiding principles to conduct similar future cases. However, the decision of the Lords reflects the differing attitudes and beliefs of the courts that had gone before. Lord Phillip’s attraction to the minority views while dismissing the appeal highlights the divisions.

Credit corporations (and to be sure others who provide documented consumer credit services) will of course receive the decision with open arms. As a consequence of the escalating frequency of purchaser and identity fraud, (likely exacerbated by new technologies such as the Internet and ecommerce), this judgment provides considerable reassurance for those who conclude contracts inter absentes or using a written process to contract.

In distinction, the innocent third party[48]purchaser remains unprotected. There persists a significant scope for differences of opinion to arise in situations where contracts are formed inter absentes against those formed inter praesentes. This also highlights the prudence of ensuring that contracts always conclude in writing.

The solution proposed by Lords Nichols and Millett in these situations is likely to prove more attractive to the general populous and mandates through code in other jurisdictions[49]. However, the House of Lords have left any decision to reform the law to parliament.

Bibliography

1. Adams, John N. & Brownsword, Roger (2004) “Understanding Contract Law” 4th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, UK

2. Beatson, J. (2002) “Anson’s Law of Contract”. 28th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK

3. Beale, H.G., Bishop, W.D. & Furmston, M.P. (2001) “Contract, Cases and Materials”. 4th Edition, London: Butterworths, UK

4. Brown, I. and A. (2005) “Chandler Blackstone’s Q&A Law of Contract”. 5th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK

5. Fischer, S & Hurley, A. (1995) “Trade and Commerce – International Trade”, in Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, Vol 27 Title 420.

6. Furmston, M.P. “Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract”. London: Butterworths, UK

7. Hanson, Sharon (2004) “English for Law and Legal Studies”, University of London Press

8. Hare, Christopher (2004) “Identity Mistakes: A Missed Opportunity?” The Modern Law Review, Volume 67 Page 993 – November 2004 Volume 67 Issue 6

9. McKendrick, Ewan (2005) “Contract Law” 6th Edition, Palgrave MacMillan Law Masters, UK[1]

10. McKendrick, Ewan (2005) “Contract: Text and Materials” 2ndEdition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK [2]

11. Poole, J. (2005) “Casebook on Contract Law” 7th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK

12. Smith, J.C. (2000) “Smith & Thomas: A Casebook on Contract”. 11thEdition, London: Sweet & Maxwell, UK

13. Standing, Greg (2003) “Back to Basics” Wragge & Co

14. Stone, R. (2005) “The Modern Law of Contract” 6th Edition. London: Cavendish

15. Treitel, G.H. (1999) “The Law of Contract”. 10th Edition, London: Butterworths

16. Treitel, G.H. (2003) “The Law of Contract”. 11th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell

17. University of London(2006) “Recent developments in Laws” Published by: University of London Press

Cases

Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540, per Lord Morris at p.545
Bell v Lever Bros [1932] AC 161
Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 AC 552, 573
Brogden v Metropolitan Rlwy (1877) 2 App Cas 666
City & Westminster Pties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129
Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459
Fawcett v Star Car Sales Ltd [1960] NZLR 406 at 413
Hartog v Collins & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566
Hector v Lyons 58 P&CR 156
Helby v Mathews [1985] AC 471
Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 QB 31, 55
Jacobs v Batavia & General Plantations etc [1924] 1 Ch 287
King’s Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge, Merrett & Co Ltd (1897) 14 TLR 98
Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198
Mercantile Credit v. Hamblin [1965] 2 QB 242, 269
Philips v Brooks Ltd [1919] 2 KB 243
Raffels v Wichellaus (1864) 2 H&C 906
Scriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564
Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2001] EWCA Civ 1000 {“Shogun CA”}
Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [2003] 3 WLR 1371 {“Shogun Finance”}; Shogun finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 AC 919, 978H
Smith v Hughes (1870-1) LR 6 QB 597
The Great Pace [2002] 3 WLR 1617
Young v Schuler 11 QBD 651

Statues and Regulations

Consumer Credit Act 1974, UK
Higher-Purchase Act 1964, UK
Sale of Goods Act 1979, UK

Part Two – Methods used to write the review

To research the case of Shogun v Hudson[50], the first logical step was to obtain and read the case. As the House of Lords decided this case, a search for the case name and reference on the United Kingdomparliament[51]site provided the opinions of the Lords. Next, this page referenced the appeal proceedings[52]. A search on Westlaw[53]provided the judgment as delivered from the Court of Appeal[54].

Reading both the judgments from the Court of Appeal and the opinions delivered by the House of Lords provided in-depth analysis of the cases used by their Lordships in deciding the outcome of this case. To understand the reasoning behind the conflicting positions taken by the Lords it was necessary to study the individual cases applied in the reasoning. To this end, Westlaw again provided a useful resource.

The end of this point was to reread the case stopping to interject readings from the cases used in the decisions. Re-readings next divide between the majority decisions in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords and the minority positions.

Having summarised the positions accorded to the majority and minority separately, the next stage involved researching the fundamental principles that each perspective applied. This involved catalogue searches in the library. Computerised catalogue searches turned up a number of textbooks and other treatises on both contract law and the law of mistake. The bibliography lists these texts.

It was necessary to reread both the cases and several of the chapters from the textbooks due to the often-conflicting opinions held by many of the authors. Mistake would seem to be a “hot topic” surrounding the English law of contract. There are a wide range of perspectives to what should apply and how.

Notes in hand, and with summarised versions of the cases, the next stage was to structure the paper. This involved dividing the issues into separate headings and creating a paper in point form. Before embarking further, a search[55]for articles, legal journals and other academic reviews of this case provided examples as to how others had approached this task.

These papers[56]provided both a greater insight into the case as well as additional perspectives and documentary structures. This case provided an interesting insight into the competing philosophies underpinning the law. In particular, the analysis provided a fascinating insight into the decision process used in the determination of a difficult moral case where neither party had wronged the other, but where both have suffered.

The final stage involved writing the paper. This occurred in stages with several drafts, each expanding on the last. The use of electronic notes and summarise excerpts from the various papers, treatises and cases simplified this process. Once the paper had been written and proofread, the footnotes and bibliography next became the focus. This involved changing summary entries into their correct citation format.

The conclusion was to reread the paper over until no further spelling or grammatical errors turned up.

Bibliography

Armstrong, Stephen V., & Timothy P. Terrell, (2003) “Thinking Like a Writer: A Lawyer’s Guide to Effective Writing and Editing” Practising Law Institute; 2nd edition
Garner, Bryan A., (2001) “Legal Writing in Plain English: A Text with Exercises” University Of Chicago Press
Nedzel, Nadia E., (2004) “Legal Reasoning, Research, and Writing for International and Graduate Students” Aspen Publishers, Inc.
Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jd031119/shogun-1.htm)
Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2001] EWCA Civ 1001 (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1000.html
Stuhmcke, Anita (2001) “Butterworths Guide, Legal Referencing”, 2nd Ed. Butterworths Au.
Webb, Julian S. & Holland, James A. (2003) “Learning Legal Rules”, 5th Ed. Oxford University Press
Westlaw (http://www.westlaw.com/)
UK Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/ and http://www.publications.parliament.uk

[1] Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson[2003] UKHL 62, [2003] 3 WLR 1371 {“Shogun Finance”}; Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2001] EWCA Civ 1000 {“Shogun CA”}

[2] Sale of Goods Act 1979; Helby v Mathews [1985] AC 471

[3] Ibid s23

[4] Brooke LJ in Shogun CAat 51

[5] Sedley LJ in Shogun CAat 11

[6] Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson[2003] UKHL 62, [2003] 3 WLR 1371

[7] “The rogue produced a driving licence in the name of Durlabh Patel of 45 Mayflower Road, Leicester”.

[8] Sedley LJ at 3 “The Facts, (e)” in Shogun CA

[9] s 27 of the Higher-Purchase Act 1964, as substituted by the Consumer

Credit Act 1974, provides:

1. This section applies where a motor vehicle has been bailed, under a hire purchase agreement, or has been agreed to be sold under a conditional sale agreement and, before the property in the vehicle has become vested in the debtor, he disposes of the vehicle to another person.

2. Where the disposition referred to in subsection (1) above is to a private purchaser, as he is a purchaser of the motor vehicle in good faith, without notice of the hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement that disposition shall have effect as if the creditor’s title to the vehicle has been vested in the debtor immediately before that disposition.

s 27 of the Higher Purchase Act 1964corresponds with s 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which states under the heading Sale under voidable title:

“When the seller of goods has a voidable title to them, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of the seller’s defect of title.”

[10] Dyson LJ in Shogun CAat 32, “I agree that the claimant could not hold Mr Patel liable under the hire purchase agreement. That is because his signature was forged, and he would be able to say that the agreement was not his contract”.

[11] Sedley LJ in Shogun CA at 16, “Accepting that the dealer was not the finance company’s general agent, did he nevertheless represent the claimants in the way described by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Branwhite v. Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 AC 552, 573, when he pointed out that «A dealer may for some ad hoc purpose be the agent of a finance company» and adopted what Pearson LJ had said in Mercantile Credit v. Hamblin [1965] 2 QB 242, 269:

There is no rule of law that in a hire purchase transaction the dealer never is, or always is, acting as agent for the finance company or as agent for the customer… Nevertheless, the dealer is to some extent an intermediary between the customer and the finance company, and he may well have in a particular case some ad hoc agencies to do particular things on behalf of one or the other or, it may be, both of those two parties”.

[12] Hire Purchase Act 1964 (c 53), ss. 27(1)(2), 29(4) (as substituted by Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39), s. 192(3)(a), Sch. 4, para 22)

[13] Dyson LJ in Shogun CA at 44, “Lords Reid and Wilberforce dissented on the agency issue. In my judgment, it is unhelpful and potentially misleading to say that the dealer in the present case was the agent of the finance company. It is true that the company had delegated to the dealer the task of performing various functions, including the ascertainment of the identity of the hirer, and conveying the driving licence and the draft agreement signed by the rogue. For these purposes, the dealer acted as the company’s agent in what Lord Upjohn described as the “loose sense of being a go-between for the intending purchaser and the finance company». But it seems that the dealer had no authority to make any decisions that were binding on the claimant. It certainly had no authority to enter into the contract on behalf of the claimant. It was merely an intermediary for the purposes of obtaining and communicating information about the hirer to the company. If the dealer had been authorised by the company to make the hire purchase agreement, then in my view the face to face principle would have applied. There would have been a presumption that the dealer, as agent, had intended to make the contract with the person to whom it made the offer face to face. But in my judgment, on the facts of this case, no such presumption arose”.

[14] Dyson LJ held that section 27 of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 did not avail Mr Hudson, as the rogue was not the party named in the written hire-purchase agreement and therefore was not the debtor under the agreement.

[15] Ibid

[16] Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 QB 31, 55

Facts of the case. Elsie and Hilda Ingram were joint owners of a car. They advertised the car for sale. A rogue, falsely calling himself “Hutchinson”, came to view the car. He offered ₤ 717 to the women for the car, which they accepted. When he produced a chequebook to pay for the car, Elsie Ingram stated they would not, under no circumstances accept a cheque. The rogue told them he was PGM Hutchinson, of Stanstead House, Caterham. Hilda Ingram checked in the telephone directory that there was indeed a PGM Hutchinson residing at that address. The women then accepted the rogue’s cheque as consideration for the car. The rogue, who had in the meantime had sold the car to the innocent defendant, was not PGM Hutchinson and the cheque was dishonoured. The women now sought to recover the car from the defendant.

Pearce LJ stated, “Each case must be decided on its own facts. The question in such cases is this. Has it been sufficiently shown in the particular circumstances that, contrary to the prima facie presumption, a party was not contracting with the physical person to whom he uttered the offer, but with another individual whom (as the other party ought to have understood) he believed to be the physical person present. The answer to that question is a finding of fact”.

Devlin LJ stated, “It is, I think, a mixed question of fact and law. I am sure that any attempt to solve it as a pure question of fact would fail. If Miss Ingram had been asked whether she intended to contract with the man in the room or with P. G. M. Hutchinson, the question could have no meaning for her, since she believed them both to be one and the same. The reasonable man of the law – if he stood in Miss Ingram’s shoes – could not give any better answer. (…)”.

[17] Dyson LJ in Shogun CAat 36, “It is common ground that the agreement had not been avoided before the rogue purported to sell the car to the defendant. As Pearce LJ said in Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 QB 31, 55:

The question here is whether there was any contract, whether offer and acceptance met. For, as Gresson P. said in Fawcett v. Star Car Sales Ltd, «a void contract is a paradox; in truth there is no contract at all.»”

[18] Bank of Australasia v Palmer [1897] AC 540, per Lord Morris at p.545; Young v Schuler 11 QBD 651

[19] Parole Evidence Rule; McKendrick (2005) pp184-186; Adams & Brownsword (2004); Stone (2005); Trietel (2003); Jacobs v Batavia & General Plantations etc [1924] 1 Ch 287; City & Westminster Pties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129

[20] Hector v Lyons 58 P&CR 156

[21] Shogun Finance, at 55

[22] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 21 (Sale by person not the owner)

(1) Subject to this Act, where goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell. (…)

[23] Shogun Finance at 49

Lord Phillips in [24]Shogun, at 111 “This appeal is a variation on a theme that has bemused courts and commentators alike for over 150 years. Two individuals conduct negotiations in which all the terms necessary to constitute a binding contract are agreed. One of those individuals has, however, been masquerading as a third party. Does a binding contract result? Grappling with this problem in Fawcett v Star Car Sales Ltd [1960] NZLR 406 at 413, Gresson P remarked that ‘the difficulty in deciding whether a mistake of identity prevents the formation of a concluded contract is a proper assessment of the facts rather than the ascertainment of the law’. The issues that arise in this case require the facts to be set out with some particularity”.

[25] Lord Walker in Shogun Finance at 188

[26] Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 QB 31

[27] King’s Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge, Merrett & Co Ltd (1897) 14 TLR 98

[28] Parole Evidence Rule; McKendrick (2005) pp184-186; Adams & Brownsword (2004); Stone (2005); Trietel (2003); Jacobs v Batavia & General Plantations etc [1924] 1 Ch 287; City & Westminster Pties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129

[29] Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459 – where no contract was said to exist i.e. void

[30] Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198 – a case of voidable contract.

Facts of the case; Mr Lewis, a post-graduate chemistry student, sold his car to a rogue. The rogue falsely represented himself as the film actor Richard Greene, who played Robin Hood in the “Robin Hood” series. The rogue issued a cheque for ₤ 450, which was dishonoured. The rogue sold the car to Mr Averay, a music student with The Royal College of Music, London.

Lord Denning MR stated, “This is another case where one of two innocent persons has to suffer for the fraud of a third. It will no doubt interest students and find its place in the textbooks. (…) The real question in the case is whether on May 8, 1969, there was a contract of sale under which the property in the car passed from Mr. Lewis to the rogue. If there was such a contract, then, even though it was voidable for fraud, nevertheless Mr. Averay would get a good title to the car. But if there was no contract of sale by Mr. Lewis to the rogue – either because there was, on the face of it, no agreement between the parties, or because any apparent agreement was a nullity and void ab initio for mistake, then no property would pass from Mr. Lewis to the rogue. Mr. Averay would not get a good title because the rogue had no property to pass to him.

As I listened to the argument in this case, I felt it wrong that an innocent purchaser (who knew nothing of what passed between the seller and the rogue) should have his title depend on such refinements. After all, he has acted with complete circumspection and in entire good faith: whereas it was the seller who let the rogue have the goods and thus enabled him to commit the fraud. I do not, therefore, accept the theory that a mistake as to identity renders a contract void. I think the true principle is (…): When two parties have come to a contract – or rather what appears, on the face of it to be a contract – the fact that one party is mistaken as to the identity of the other does not mean that there is no contract, or that the contract is a nullity and void from the beginning. It only means that the contract is voidable, that is, liable to be set aside at the instance of the mistaken person, so long as he does so before third parties have in good faith acquired rights under it.

In this case, Mr. Lewis made a contract of sale with the very man, the rogue, who came to the flat. I say that he «made a contract» because in this regard we do not look into his intentions, or into his mind to know what he was thinking or into the mind of the rogue. We look to the outward appearances. (… The contract) was, of course, induced by fraud. The rogue made false representations as to his identity. But it was still a contract, though voidable for fraud. It was a contract under which this property passed to the rogue, and in due course passed from the rogue to Mr. Averay, before the contract was avoided. Though I very much regret that either of these good and reliable gentlemen should suffer, in my judgment it is Mr. Lewis who should do so. I think the appeal should be allowed and judgment entered for the defendant.”

[31] Brooke LJ in Shogun Financeat 1

[32] Nicholls LJ at 36 in Shogun Finance.

[33] Lord Denning in Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198

[34] Reflecting the comments made by Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal (Shogun CA)

[35] Lord Nicholls at 35 in Shogun Finance

[36] Lord Millett at 82 in Shogun Finance

[37] Lord Millett at 57 in Shogun Finance

[38] Adams & Brownsword (2004)

[39] Phillips LJ at 169 – 170, “Lord Nicholls of Birkenheadand Lord Millett propose an elegant solution to this illogicality. Where two individuals deal with each other, by whatever medium, and agree terms of a contract, then a contract will be concluded between them, notwithstanding that one has deceived the other into thinking that he has the identity of a third party. In such a situation the contract will be voidable but not void. While they accept that this approach cannot be reconciled with Cundy v Lindsay, they conclude that Cundy v Lindsay was wrongly decided and should no longer be followed.

While I was strongly attracted to this solution, I have found myself unable to adopt it.”

[40] Lord Nicholls at 35, “Accordingly, if the law of contract is to be coherent and rescued from its present unsatisfactory and unprincipled state, the House has to make a choice: either to uphold the approach adopted in Cundy v Lindsay and overrule the decisions in Phillips v Brooks Ltd and Lewis v Averay, or to prefer these later decisions to Cundy v Lindsay”.

[41] Bell v Lever Bros [1932] AC 161; The Great Pace [2002] 3 WLR 1617

[42] Common mistake similar to mutual mistake defines a situation where both parties to agreement are mistaken. In mutual mistake, it is possible that both parties are mistaken about separate parts of the agreement. Common mistake however occurs where both parties are mistaken as to the same term. Raffels v Wichellaus (1864) 2 H&C 906 provides an example where both parties were at cross-purposes.

[43] Smith v Hughes (1870-1) LR 6 QB 597; Scriven Bros & Co v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564; Hartog v Collins & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566.

[44] Treitel (2003), pp 309-310.

[45] Lord Walker at 183, Shogun Finance

[46] Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459

[47] Philips v Brooks Ltd [1919] 2 KB 243

[48] For instance of second hand goods who has not gone through a dealer.

[49] For example, the United States of America has a Uniform Commercial Code which codifies much of the contract common law (The Sales Article of the (USA) UCC (Uniform Commercial Code))

[50] Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson[2003] UKHL 62

[51]http://www.parliament.uk/

[52] “on appeal from: [2001] EWCA Civ 1000”

[53] Westlaw (http://www.westlaw.com/)

[54] Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson[2001] EWCA Civ 1001

[55] Athens, Blackwell/Synergy (the Modern Law Review), Westlaw

[56] As listed in the bibliography

La necesidad de la identidad al firmar. S. Tominaga, AKA CSW

La necesidad de la identidad al firmar

La necesidad de la identidad para firmar

Firmas seudónimas

Firmas anónimas

Ley de identidad y firma digital en el Reino Unido

Implicaciones legales de la identidad en las transacciones digitales

Apéndice – Notas anteriores:

Resumen de los hechos del caso

Tribunal de Apelación

Cámara de los Lores

La minoría pide reformas

Definición de error

Error en cuanto a la identidad

Conclusión

The Necessity of Identity in Signing

Bibliography

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